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Peace can generate an economic dividend, which can be further increased by appropriate 
economic reform. This dividend can in turn be used to raise popular support for conflict 
resolution measures along the road to achieving a final political settlement, a strategy that 
characterizes the recent period in Sri Lanka. However, despite an increase in economic 
growth following the cessation of hostilities between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) and the government, no substantial dividend materialized for either 
government supporters in the South or LTTE supporters in the war-torn Northeast. The 
causes of this failure include delays in disbursing aid which would have eased adjustment 
to economic reforms—resulting in cuts to public spending that affected Southern 
households—and weak institutions that impeded the effective use of aid in the Northeast. 
The Sri Lankan experience highlights some important lessons for both government and 
donors on making use of an economic lever for consolidating a peace process and conflict 
resolution. It also highlights some of the dangers in relying too much on economic levers 
to consolidate a peace process when levels of mistrust are very high. 
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There is a growing body of literature and practice on the characteristics of war-torn 
economies and the policies of post-conflict reconstruction. This has led to substantial 
policy initiatives and new mechanisms for peacebuilding. Surprisingly, however, there 
is little systematic analysis of the ways in which economic factors contribute to the 
success or failure of peace agreements (Woodward 2002; Addison 2003). Sri Lanka’s 
experience over 2002-03 provides a good case study of the potential to use economic 
levers in conflict resolution.  
By 2001, Sri Lanka had experienced nearly two decades of conflict with the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) waging war for a separate state in Northeast region. A 
severe economic crisis resulted and when a conflict resolution package was introduced 
in early 2002 and peace talks initiated, steps were taken simultaneously to revive the 
economy. This process initially sidestepped the most controversial political issues and 
focused instead on confidence building of which an ‘economic dividend’ was an 
important element, consisting of (i) economic rebuilding (ii) a new institutional set-up 
for the Northeast with the LTTE being an equal partner for the first time and 
(iii) increased foreign aid, including an IMF programme, for economic revival as well 
as for relief and reconciliation work, thereby bringing international actors into conflict 
resolution efforts.  
The resolution process was mediated and influenced by the Norwegians, and Jan 
Peterson, the Norwegian Foreign Minister commented, ‘Most armed conflicts … have 
their origin in poverty and discrimination. But it is increasingly clear that lack of 
economic opportunities and pure greed are prominent causes as well. Hence, in 
preventing and resolving armed conflicts, we must focus on the economic dimensions of 
the war’ (Jan Peterson quoted in IPA 2002: 17). 
Sri Lanka’s economy was broadly back on track, but delivering on the promised 
economic dividend to lock-in the peace process and to build support for the government 
proved difficult and complex. Impediments on both the government and rebel sides, as 
well as in donor policies, are the cause. The LTTE complained that the Northeast’s 
economic dividend was too little and too late. The peace talks faltered in April 2003, 
and the government lost the 2004 elections, but the war did not resume. And the 
tsunami in December 2004 added to the complications, while also devastating the 
economies and communities of coastal areas.  
This paper evaluates the role of the economic dividend in the conflict resolution 
process, and why the dividend itself turned out to be disappointing. An exercise of this 
nature has certain limitations. First, we are dealing with a relatively short period 
(2002-03), and the economic benefits of peace take time to emerge. This may be true, 
but even within a two-year period it is possible to see whether the economic dividend is 
working, and this is the focus of this paper. Second, the peace process was put into 
effect at a time of uneasy cohabitation between the president (Chandrika Kumaratunge 
from a centre-left political party) and the government, and the power base of the prime 
minister (Ranil Wickremasinghe from a centre-right political party) was weak. This may 
have influenced the final outcome, in addition to problems with the economic dividend. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the background work done in 
preparation for the economic dividend. Sections 3 and 4 analyse the economic dividend 2 
in Sri Lanka from the perspective of the South and Northeast, respectively. Section 5 
examines the political economy of the peace process, and section 6 concludes. 
2  Background to the peace process 
Sri Lanka’s economy at the start of the millennium was in dire straights. After a number 
of military reversals, Sri Lanka recorded a negative growth rate of -1.4 per cent, the 
only country in South Asia to do so in 2001. Poor performance was due to external 
factors as well as domestic economic mismanagement (IPS 2002; Kelegama 2003 and 
others). The IMF standby package signed in early 2001 fell apart, the budget deficit was 
nearly 11 per cent of GDP, the ratio of public debt to GDP was more than 100 per cent, 
and the inflation rate was in two-digits. 
Given the burden of the defence budget (running at 5-6 per cent of GDP) and 
diminishing opportunities for short-term revenue generation (most of the ‘cash cows’ 
available for privatization had been exhausted) the new government, formed in late 
2001 by the United National Front (UNF), concluded that peace with the LTTE was the 
only way to revive the economy and to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) again. 
For its part, the LTTE leadership was faced by a dwindling cadre of members and 
general war weariness, and was sensitive to a hardening of global attitudes to terrorism 
following the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Thus, the Tigers wanted a breather to 
re-group and disassociate themselves from terrorism (Gunaratna 2003). Consequently, 
this ‘win-win’ situation steered both parties towards peace talks. 
2.1  Basic steps for confidence building 
The government turned to reviving the economy following the signing of a ceasefire 
agreement (CFA) and the setting up of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). The 
government and donors acknowledged the LTTE as an important political player in 
developing the Northeast and for building peace. Accordingly, the peace package lifted 
the embargo of Southern goods to the Northeast and opened up a major highway (A-9) 
to ease the movement of goods, services and labour.  
After this initial phase, the government and LTTE conducted five rounds of 
unconditional peace talks, without either party having to decommission weapons. For 
the division of power, the government-controlled areas at the time of the CFA were 
classified as ‘high security zones’ (HSZ) while the LTTE-controlled areas reflected the 
situation as it had been in early 2002. Donors assisted with the removal of landmines 
and building a framework for resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 
related measures in the areas of land and water rights as well as fishing rights to rebuild 
livelihoods. The government’s aim was to negotiate a political solution once the 
preliminary phase of confidence building and reconstruction of war-torn areas had been 
concluded, and once an economic dividend for the Northeast had arrived (see later 
discussion). 3 
2.2  Institutional structure for building peace 
The previous government’s attempts to provide assistance to the Northeast were based 
on a ‘3-Rs’ strategy (relief, reconciliation and rehabilitation) in which relief efforts were 
coordinated between government, aid donors and NGOs. But the LTTE had been left 
out of the process because the government refused to recognize the parallel 
administration in areas under the LTTE control. Moreover, the ‘3-Rs’ framework 
neglected the issue of fishing and land rights of returning IDPs (JBIC 2003: 58). The 
LTTE perceived the government to be using relief to woo people away from their areas. 
These concerns needed to be addressed by creating new institutional structures.  
The Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) was established in January 
2002, while the LTTE Peace Secretariat (as a counterpart to SCOPP) was opened in 
December 2002. A joint taskforce was set up to deal with relief, resettlement, and 
development, and the LTTE was treated as an equal partner in the taskforce. However, 
the taskforce was not demarcated properly, and was abandoned in late 2002 in favour of 
three subcommittees: the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian Relief and 
Rehabilitation (SIHRN); the Sub-Committee on Military De-escalation (SMD), and the 
Sub-Committee on Political Issues (SPI) to provide support to the war-affected people. 
The UNF government’s political power was shaky; the legislation was in conflict with 
the executive and the state system was not very stable. The constitution precluded the 
prime minister from embarking on any radical and innovative measures to resolve the 
issues underlying the Northeast conflict. Thus, the government initially was reluctant to 
introduce proposals for new institutional structures, and the subcommittees were all set 
up as individual bodies without legislative status. Constitutional problems precluded 
follow up on the initiative contained in the UNF manifesto for an interim administration 
in the Northeast. 
SIHRN was entrusted with the allocation of the finances needed for prioritized 
activities, selection of the appropriate implementing agencies, and identification of the 
humanitarian and reconstruction needs. The activities initiated by SIHRN were to be 
financed with the so-called the Northeast Reconstruction Fund (NERF) vested with the 
World Bank. 
2.3  Economic revival package 
By the start of 2002 the disintegrating IMF standby package had to be rescued, the 
budget deficits reduced, aid utilization improved, and the economy put back on a 
growth track. Although the March 2002 budget implemented measures to this effect, 
these had very little to offer the poor, with the government relying on economic growth 
to reduce poverty. 
Second-generation reforms were greatly delayed in the Sri Lanka. Although 
privatization had been introduced, it covered only a few utilities such as gas, telecom, 
seaports and airlines. Many public utilities needed restructuring but this was delayed by 
the 1999 provincial elections and the 2000 general elections and it was up to the newly 
elected UNF government to get on with reforms. Legislative reforms to support the 
market economy, institutional change, and deregulation to stimulate private sector 4 
growth were the main elements of the new policy package, although these were not 
without political costs for a government with a small parliamentary majority.  
The results were impressive. The economy grew by 4 per cent in 2002 and 5.9 per cent 
in 2003, and there was a remarkable pick-up in tourism which had been deterred by the 
war. In the Northeast, total fish catches doubled as a result of relaxed restrictions and 
rice production increased fivefold. Net FDI inflow increased from US$82 million in 
2001 to US$300 million by 2003 and a large inflow of portfolio investment pushed the 
stock market beyond its 1994 peak.  
2.4 Donor  assistance 
The government saw the donors as vital to the peace process. As Moragoda, a leading 
member of the peace process (2003b: 261) states: ‘the international community should 
recognize that they too have a stake in the outcome of these negotiations, that we 
believe, is our surest guarantee of success’. 
Donor assistance has contributed since 2002 to the rehabilitation of the Northeast region 
with the construction of 45 km of a major highway, hundreds of kilometres of small 
roads, irrigation tanks, water wells as well as 55 schools, 25 health facilities, and the 
relocation of over 32,000 IDP families.  
Donor assistance increased once the terms of IMF’s standby package had been met by 
the end of 2002. The IMF approved a poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF) and 
an extended fund facility (EFF) totalling US$567 in April 2003 to run until 2006, with 
fiscal conditionality requiring reduction in the public debt and structural reforms to 
reduce the public sector’s role. The World Bank committed US$2.7 billion for 98 
different projects, while the Asian Development Bank loans totalled US$2.7 billion. The 
World Bank lending programme through to 2006 consists of about four projects per 
year, totalling US$800 million. The European Commission approved €3.27 million in 
support of Sri Lanka’s peace process.  
By mid-2003 the rate of aid utilization had increased from 13 per cent in 2001 to about 
21 per cent (CBSL 2003: 197). The reforms and the government’s medium-term 
economic strategy outlined in the Vision and Strategy document (RSL 2003) received 
strong support at the Tokyo meeting with donors in June 2003 with pledges worth 
US$4.5 billion (25 per cent of 2003 GDP), of which 16 per cent was earmarked for the 
Northeast’s reconstruction (ERD 2004). The Norwegians also supported aid 
mobilization for the peace process. 
Release of funds was contingent not only on the implementation of reforms, but also on 
positive developments in the peace progress—which was not clearly defined 
(Ladduwahetty 2004). Donors generally prefer to tie aid disbursement to improvements 
in human rights, democracy and good governance. Japan’s aid is, for example, linked to 
such measures as strict compliance with the CFA and rulings of the SLMM; progress on 
human rights in the Northeast, the return of child soldiers to their families (and an end 
to recruitment), and progress in democracy and pluralism in LTTE-controlled areas 
(JBIC 2003). In summary, the finance provided by foreign aid was crucial to securing 
an economic dividend. Moragoda (2003a: 261) has commented: 5 
There is no doubt that without donor support from the outset, economic 
recovery could turn out to be a distant prospect. If we are unable to 
demonstrate now, in a preliminary way, the dividend that the peace will bring 
we risk the negative effect of frustration among the parties, a breakdown of 
negotiations, and the resumption of hostilities. By allowing the flow of 
assistance to commence now we could begin to show to every section of our 
people, including the LTTE, that a peaceful accommodation of interests will 
bring tangible prosperity and a better quality of life to all.  
The economic dividend was expected to help sustain the stability of the government, 
both through the support of the population in the South as well as the large Northeast 
constituency who would benefit from the dividend. It is therefore to the economic 
dividend itself that we now turn.  
4  The economic dividend in Southern Sri Lanka  
The war had high economic costs which prevented growth reaching its target of 6-8 per 
cent (Kelegama 1999; Arunatilake, Jayasuriya and Kelegama 2001). Nevertheless, the 
economy managed to expand on average by 5 per cent per annum from 1983 to 2000, 
mainly due to sectors such as tea, ready-made garments, worker remittances, etc., which 
were unaffected by the war. The war burden fell mostly on the middle class, through 
defence-related taxes and the high interest rates that were necessary to meet growing 
defence expenditures (almost 6 per cent of GDP in the late 1990s).  
Funds for rural development were reduced by higher military spending, although the 
war also had benefits for some rural households such as an increase in remittances from 
family members in the military which rose when the war escalated and recruitment went 
up. These remittances (plus those from workers in the Middle East or employed in 
garment factories) kept rural families alive as agriculture contracted (Dunham and 
Edwards 1997).  
Hence the economic dividend for the South from peace could have been substantial. 
However, its realization was undermined by three factors. First, the IMF’s adjustment 
programme was initiated by the Alliance (PA) government in March 2001, but stalled 
when the PA coalition deteriorated in June 2001, after which management of the 
coalition took priority until the December 2001 general elections (Kelegama 2003). In 
order to secure the much needed aid package, the IMF standby package had to be 
salvaged by the new UNF government, resulting in some tough decisions including 
depoliticizing and better targeting of the poverty alleviation programme (Samurdhi 
allowance); increasing utility charges; cutting fertilizer and petroleum subsidies; 
introducing a new VAT (value added tax) tax system; and freezing public sector 
recruitment and downsizing the workforce in public enterprises. Given the seriousness 
of the economic situation by the end of 2001, there was no alternative but to implement 
these measures, but aid needed to come in rapidly to ease the economy’s adjustment and 
this did not materialize on the scale expected. Although the US$4.5 billion aid package 
was substantial, only US$557 million was disbursed in 2003 (ERD 2004) when the need 
for more aid was crucial. Thus, the impact of the SAP was not effectively cushioned in 
the short run, and there was no dividend for rural households in the South. 6 
Second, most of the fiscal adjustment required by the IMF turned out to consist of 
expenditure restraint rather revenue mobilization (which turned out to be disappointing). 
Defence costs did not fall significantly despite the end of hostilities, barely resulting in 
any savings for capital expenditure, and the insignificant defence savings were absorbed 
by the costs of refugee rehabilitation, leaving capital expenditures on rural infrastructure 
to take brunt of the expenditure cuts. Fiscal tightening through expenditure restraint 
therefore occurred at precisely the time when the public finances should have been 
orientated to building peace. Addison (2003:  4), analysing Africa’s post-conflict 
scenario notes that: ‘… unrealistic and excessively tight targets for the overall fiscal 
deficit should be avoided when it endangers essential development spending’. Over-
obsession with fiscal targets therefore proved to be counter-productive in terms of 
delivering the immediate economic dividend that could have helped the peace progress. 
Third, the uneasy cohabitation between the president and the prime minister, together 
with fears that the LTTE could resume hostilities, resulted in the private sector adopting 
a wait-and-see attitude which deterred investment in risky and long-term projects, 
precisely the investment needed to create jobs. Unemployment was compounded by 
cutbacks in public-sector employment. Consequently, there was little economic 
dividend for the South 
5  Economic dividend in Northeast 
Balasingham (2004: 395) has stated that: ‘If the hardships of the people are not 
remedied and their humanitarian needs are not met, the momentum, the optimism and 
confidence that arose from the peace process will be severely undermined’. We argue 
here that all three stakeholders—the government of Sri Lanka, the LTTE, and aid 
donors—obstructed realization of the economic dividend.  
There is no denying that as a consequence of the CFA, some economic improvement 
did occur in the Northeast with improved security, better relations between 
communities, greater access to goods and services, IDP resettlement, and increased 
school enrolment (IPS 2003). But the dividend could have been much more. Currently 
the Northern Province accounts for less than 2.5 per cent of GDP and poverty is high. 
Only 3 per cent and 64 per cent of the population have access to piped water and 
electricity, respectively, compared with 52 per cent and 93 per cent in the Western 
Province (ADB 2005). 
From the LTTE perspective, a serious concern was the high security zones (HSZ). 
According to the LTTE, the Sri Lankan army, contrary to the CFA terms, continued to 
occupy public buildings in the HSZ, impeding the right of people to return home 
(Balasingham 2004: 382-3). However, according to the Satish Nambiar report, the 
withdrawal of armed forces from the HSZ was conditional on the LTTE 
decommissioning its long-range weapons, which they flatly refused to do (Godage 
2004). This was a major problem that contributed to the demise of the Sub-Committee 
on De-Escalation and delayed the economic dividend in the Northeast. 
On the government side, there were procedural delays in tendering for contracts in the 
Northeast and bureaucratic slowness with the line ministries. The same problems that 
plagued aid utilization were evident in projects earmarked for the Northeast (IPS 2001). 7 
The LTTE claimed that confidence among the Tamil people in the peace process was 
eroded by delays in humanitarian relief and resettlement as well as bureaucratic inertia 
in the SIRHN (Balasingham 2004: 415-6). Although SIRHN had identified the 
immediate needs of the people, funds were not readily made available, and provisional 
mechanisms lacked substantive implementing powers and personnel resources 
(Ferdinands et al. 2004).  
There is merit to Balasingham’s (2004: 438) criticism that the Vision and Strategy 
document (RSL 2003) failed to understand the causes of poverty and the scale of the 
Northeast’s devastation. Twenty years of war had weakened local state institutions. 
Even though government funds for relief and rehabilitation had grown after 1999, many 
felt that these had failed to make any appreciable impact on the quality of life of the 
people (Sivanathan and Thillainathan 2004). The absorptive capacity of the state’s 
development institutions had diminished to such a low level that they ‘were unable to 
utilize more than 20-30 per cent of the allocations for rehabilitation’ (JBIC 2003: 30). 
In April 2003, the LTTE, claiming that government administration was ineffective and 
there was no concrete progress in the Northeast, walked away from the peace talks, 
demanding the establishment of an interim administration in order to control finances 
and developmental matters.  
But the realization of the economic dividend was also impeded by problems in the 
LTTE’s own institutions and its military-like system of governance. LTTE taxes on all 
travel on the A-9 highway increased the prices of commodities, and the checkpoints 
added almost three days to the travel-time between Colombo and Jaffna, making 
effective delivery of goods and services impossible. Moreover, banks were reluctant to 
give loans without collateral, but most collateral was unacceptable to banks because it 
was vulnerable to LTTE control. 
In the territories under its control, the LTTE restricted the movement of people, 
particularly those of military age. This led to a mass exodus of talented people (contrary 
to expectations of a migration to the Northeast), and undermined local capacity to 
undertake rehabilitation and reconstruction. This inadequate capacity to absorb 
assistance posed a major dilemma for the donors. By April 2003 when the LTTE pulled 
out of the SIHRN, 642 projects had been identified in six districts of the Northeast 
(Godage 2005), but whether these projects could have been implemented in the given 
circumstances is questionable. 
The LTTE did not strengthen the efforts by international relief organizations over 1990-
2001 to prevent hunger in the war-affected areas. Moreover, the economic programme 
of the LTTE’s Tamil Eelam Economic Development Organization (TEEDO) was 
unclear, and no attempt was made to encourage the return of entrepreneurs from border 
areas such as Vavuniya (little has also been done to woo expatriate Tamils). Rebuilding 
infrastructure was essential for the Northeast’s reconstruction, but the LTTE insisted on 
a percentage commission from contractors, a policy not viewed favourably by donors. If 
more foreign aid is to be mobilized, there must be transparency, accountability and 
economic freedom—all unfortunately non-existent in the Northeast (Sarvananthan 
2003). The LTTE is yet to realize that running an efficient economy is a different ball 
game from executing a guerrilla war.  8 
Donor constraints exist as well. The well-known multilateral ‘needs assessment’ 
approach is based on the assumption that the nature of conflicts is generally similar and 
that they are culturally insensitive (JBIC 2003: 49). According to Bastian (2003: 150), 
‘they ignore specific histories, struggles and evolution of societies … Sri  Lanka, 
Uganda, and Afghanistan [are seen] in the same breath …’. It was assumed that market 
forces would prevail, triggering an effective private sector response, but this was largely 
not forthcoming in the Northeast where missing markets and institutions as well as 
limited democratic administration exist. 
There was also an infrastructure bias; a Marshall Plan type of approach was applied to 
reconstruction strategies, whereas immediate relief for agriculture, poultry, and fisheries 
was a more urgent priority (Shanmugaratnam 2003). The question therefore remains of 
who has actually benefited from the funds—the people of the war-torn region, or a 
network of local and foreign firms bidding for large infrastructure projects? 
(Rajasingham-Senanayake 2003). 
According to the World Bank assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina, donor-assisted 
reconstruction programmes are most effective in sectors where the priorities have been 
jointly agreed with the local authorities (Woodward 2002). However, in Sri Lanka the 
needs assessment approach marginalized local skills and undervalued local knowledge 
as well as socio-political analysis. This is unfortunately a systemic problem across many 
post-conflict countries. Donors’ geo-strategic interests have generated a complex and 
often contradictory agendas, a problem that is not confined just to Sri Lanka (Addison 
and McGillivray 2004; Ferdinands et al. 2004). Current international support for post-
conflict peacebuilding needs to be strengthened at a global level through greater 
coherence across the major policy areas (Tschirgi 2004).  
Pressure from donors and civil society groups to ensure that pledged funds would be 
somehow linked to a political settlement and human rights, posed problems for the 
LTTE, given its continuing abuse of human rights. The LTTE reacted by reneging on its 
intent to link the peace talks to progress in the political settlement and human rights 
protection. These issues were factored in by donors in late 2003, as we shall now 
discuss. 
6  Political economy dynamics of peace 
6.1  Problems for the peace process 
Although the necessary measures were in place—including institutional structures, aid 
mobilization, and confidence-building measures—managing the peace process was 
difficult, and it is worthwhile to examine the sequencing of events. 
The prime minister favoured offering an immediate economic dividend so that people 
disgruntled by war could form an anti-war coalition and thus weaken the LTTE. 
Negotiation of the core (political) issues would then come next. In short, the conflict 
was to be turned around with economic advancement, but as this was not enough, the 
UNF government offered the political concession of a federal structure for the Northeast 
in the Oslo Declaration of December 2002 (although the lack of minutes from the five 
peace rounds prevents verification of this point; Balasingham (2004: 403) argues that 9 
there is no such document as the Oslo Declaration, only a suggestion for exploring a 
solution based on federalism).  
In contrast, the PA prior to 2002 based its strategy on war-for-peace, where core issues 
were immediately put on the table. The result was a head-on confrontation with the 
LTTE, whereas the UNF peace strategy was more tolerable to the LTTE. While the PA 
plan was to isolate the LTTE from the Tamils and to use military force to weaken and 
bring them to the negotiating table (Ofstad 2002), the UNF viewed the LTTE as equal 
partners and started the process with confidence building, while deferring politically 
sensitive issues for later. 
It has been questioned whether this sequencing was realistic: should economic 
development have preceded the core activities? According to Sriskandarajah (2003), 
this is tantamount to putting the cart before the horse. Core issues could have been 
gradually introduced after the federal solution had been mooted in the Oslo Declaration, 
but it would have been difficult to start negotiations with core issues, as there was a 
large humanitarian problem and the LTTE was committed to a separate state (the right 
to self-determination, recognition of a Tamil homeland, and recognition of Tamil 
nationalism). Moreover, the Southern electorate would not have been immediately 
agreeable to accommodating LTTE demands through a fundamental restructuring of the 
state. From this perspective, the prime minister’s strategy was correct, but there were 
shortcomings in the process. 
Despite a memorandum of understanding being in effect, the LTTE continued to 
eliminate its rivals, recruit child soldiers, ignore SLMM directives, and breach the CFA 
over 1,900 times (Godage 2004). Monolithic, with no tolerance for democracy, the 
LTTE forcibly acquired the status of the ‘sole representative of the Tamil community in 
Sri Lanka’. The LTTE was suspected of wanting to use relief and rehabilitation work to 
strengthen itself, and any democratic-pluralistic mechanism that undermined this was 
not acceptable. This in turn disturbed the Southern electorate, who questioned the 
credibility of the peace package.  
On the government side, the opposition was excluded from the peace talks; the 
conditions of the Muslims in the East were not fully discussed, and core issues were 
postponed until later. Core issues were, in fact, omitted until the very end, instead of 
taking them up after the Oslo Declaration. The peace talks leveraged an economic 
dividend under a vague framework and were perceived to be a confidence-building 
effort without a specific agenda, thus enabling the LTTE and the Norwegians to shape 
events. Given this situation, the LTTE, together with the Norwegians, smartly narrowed 
the focus to a single element: the creation of an interim administration with full 
autonomy, obviously an issue where the final political solution became imperative. 
All of these factors diluted the economic peace dividend. Local and foreign investors 
who in early 2002 were interested in Northern Sri Lanka became pessimistic by early 
2003, as uncertainty engulfed the peace talks. 
6.2  An international safety net for the peace process 
The peace package’s economic dividend was going to be the prime minister’s ticket 
back to power, but when it was realized that the Northeast’s economic dividend was not 10 
materializing, a new interim administration structure to replace the SHIRN was 
proposed in June 2003 to speed up the reconstruction process. But the LTTE rejected it 
on the grounds of insufficient self-autonomy. The government asserted that any 
proposed institutional structure had to comply with the constitution and that this could 
be worked out through negotiations.  
When all efforts to rescue the peace talks failed, an international safety net was created 
and the peace process internationalized (see Moragoda 2003b: 244). This gave more 
international visibility to LTTE activities. An aid package of US$4.5 billion was 
successfully mobilized at the June 2003 meeting of donors in Tokyo. With the 
international safety net in place, the prime minister felt that the ‘no-war, no-peace’ 
scenario would create its own dynamic, making it hard for the LTTE to revert to war. 
Meanwhile, the LTTE started preparing a proposal for an interim self-governing 
authority (ISGA) for submission to the government by the end of October 2003. 
But there have been drawbacks, too. According to critics, ‘over-internationalization’ 
enabled donors to dictate terms to the government, pressuring it to negotiate with the 
rebels on LTTE terms; the safety net influenced the power balance between the parties 
and disturbed the existing status quo (Ferdinands et al. 2004), by strengthening, for 
example, patriotic forces who were opposed to the government’s peace package in the 
South. The opposition in fact threatened to abandon the CFA to topple the government. 
Moreover, as discussed earlier, donors were tardy in delivering on their aid promises 
and shortfalls in aid disbursement precluded cushioning the costs of the stabilization 
programme for the poor, giving rise to hardship through 2003 (CBSL 2003: 198). 
Furthermore, each donor followed its own policy regardless of the general agreement in 
Tokyo to release funds against progress within peace process, with each donor varying 
in how they interpreted progress (or lack of) in human rights, good governance, and 
pluralism.  
6.3  Setbacks to the peace process: ISGA and electoral defeat 
As 2003 wore on, the president increasingly felt that placating the LTTE was 
threatening Sri Lanka’s unitary status, and in November she took over three ministries, 
including defence, a use of executive power that substantially shook the government. At 
the time, the LTTE put forward an ISGA as a counter-proposal to the government’s 
June 2003 interim administration. The LTTE saw the ISGA as an absolute necessity to 
ensure the fulfilment of both short-term development needs and long-term demands for 
internal self determination (Stokke and Shanmugaratnam 2005). 
The issues debated in five rounds of talks were finally reduced to a single issue: namely 
the establishment, through extra constitutional means, of the ISGA with full plenary 
powers of governance over the Northeast under LTTE’s hegemony—described by 
experts as basically a blue-print for a separate state (Gunasekera 2004; Godage 2004; 
De Silva 2004). But as the LTTE lacked legitimate status, granting financial and 
political power to a body in its control would have been difficult under the constitution.  
The prime minister had hoped to capitalize on the economic dividend in the elections of 
April 2004. But its absence contributed to the ruling party’s defeat, despite the UNF’s 
reputation for greater fiscal competence than the PA, so the appeasement of the LTTE 11 
may also have undermined UNF support. Negotiations with the LTTE could have been 
more effective had the prime minister inherited a healthier economy and stronger 
parliamentary support. But the lack of institutions and structures, especially in war-
affected areas, imposes limitations on realizing economic progress so quickly, while 
many of the political, cultural, and sociological issues take more time to address.  
7 Concluding  remarks 
Some progress was made in achieving peace and preventing the reoccurrence of LTTE 
hostilities. But there was no concrete economic dividend, nor significant progress 
towards conflict resolution. The outcome in Sri Lanka needs to be examined from the 
perspective of each party concerned: government, rebels, and donors.  
The government adopted a ‘top-down’ approach which involved little consultation with 
civil society and no widespread discussion. Nor was political opposition included. It 
was an open-ended approach, consisting basically of confidence-building negotiations 
in which the government was prepared to see how matters evolved. The lack of a 
specific agenda gave the LTTE the upper hand in dictating the peace process towards 
the ‘single-issue’ trajectory of the ISGA. The public viewed the government’s 
increasing sensitivity to LTTE dictates as appeasement, a stand also taken by moderate 
Tamil politicians (Anandasangari 2005).  
The assumption that an economic dividend would quickly arise once the necessary 
measures were taken was undermined by missing markets and institutions in Northeast, 
and the aid that was received was therefore less effective than it could have been. 
Despite the increase in growth, the distribution of benefits largely bypassed the poor. 
Aid pledges for the war-ravaged areas were received before the creation of an effective 
mechanism for utilizing the funds. Ignoring core issues meant that major tasks became 
the responsibility of substitute structures (the SIHRN, for example) that lacked capacity 
and political clout. And the institutional structure was not linked to an ultimate 
resolution such as federalism.  
The LTTE was generally not interested in relief and reconstruction measures, unless it 
controlled their delivery. A strong economic dividend with no ownership was bound to 
weaken the LTTE’s political stronghold in the Northeast and undermine its ultimate 
objective of self-determination; the LTTE thus feared marginalization, a fear that the 
government failed to address effectively. Whether the LTTE was honestly seeking a 
political settlement within the framework of a united Sri Lanka is an open question. The 
CFA enabled the LTTE to add to its military strength, since decommissioning weapons 
was not part of the negotiations, thereby in some eyes serving their goal of ultimate 
secession. If this were the case then no amount of economic dividend in the Northeast 
could have produced a political solution within the framework of united Sri Lanka. 
In any new agenda for foreign aid, aid absorption must be strengthened by capacity-
building especially in war-torn areas which lack human resources and institutions. Thus, 
the problem is not limited finances but the recipient’s inability to create an environment 
conducive to the best utilization of aid, an issue which is important not only for Sri 
Lanka (Tschirgi 2004: i).  12 
Ultimately, the issue boils down to creating a minimum level of trust between the 
parties, and an economic dividend—while certainly desirable—may be an inadequate 
tool for resolving conflicts between groups with deep-rooted mistrust. Thus, in order to 
make the economic dividend more effective, other factors must be addressed 
simultaneously. Only then can the hoped-for dividend strengthen peace and achieve 
conflict resolution. 
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